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any reasonable construction it can be avoided ;5 and that a construction which will sustain' the will, if consistent with the testator's intention and with existing rules of law, must be adopted.'
Having ascertained that a remainder passed to the grandchildren,
under our present statutory law it would necessarily follow that
an estate in fee passed,7 there being no words of limitation thereon.
Thus, it would seem that our court has merely echoed the express
holdings of many former cases and has applied sound principles
of law upon which, it appears, West Virginia lawyers can rely.
Although the parties and the court made no mention of it,
the present case might have been considered as one of mistake in
the description of the property. Had T said "the share," indicating the moiety held by A and B respectively, instead of "kis
share," which seemed to refer to the life estate preceding the remainder, then the remainders would have been clearly designated.
The appellant in the instant ease could have proceeded from this
viewpoint, introducing evidence to show that the language meant
"the share."" The court could then have construed the will in the
light of that testimony on the theory of falsa denwnstratio non
nocet - a false description does not harm a document.'
H. P. B., Jr.
H. L. W., Jr.
WoRKMEN's COMPENSATIoN ACT - EMPLOYER'S RIGHT TO
SUBROGATION. - P brought an action against D to recover the
amount that P had been compelled to pay into the workmen's
compensation fund as a result of D's allegedly wrongful act. D
operated a railroad which had a spur track that ran under P's
tipple. One of D's engines pushed a train of empty cars onto this
spur, and one of the cars struck and killed P's employee. Because
6Leary v. Kerber, 255 Ill.
433, 99 N. E. 662 (1912); In re Gallien, 247 N.
Y. 95, 160 N. E. 8 (1928) ; and see Chicago Bank of Commerce v. McPherson,
62 F. (2d) 393, 397 (C. C. A. 6th,, 1932), 'Nothing is better settled than that
the law strives to uphold testamentary dispositions of property wherever it
can, and that no matter what words are used by the testator to express his
intention, or in what peculiar or technical language he expresses it, courts will
give effect to it as it may be gathered from the entire will." Italics supplied.)
7W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 36, art. 1, j 11.
8HARASON, WILLS & ADmmNSTRATiO

§ 197 (5).

9ATKINSON, WILLs (1937) § 111; Warren, Interpretation of Wills-Becnt
Developments (1936) 49 HARv. L. Rnv. 689, 699; Note (1930) 78 U. oP PA. L.
REv. 1035; Warren, The Progress of the Law (1920) 33 HA~v. L. Rsv. 556,
560-565.
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cf this death P was forced to pay into the fund $15,000. P claimed
that by common-law principles of subrogation he should be entitled to recover this amount from D, the tort-feasor. Held, that in
the absence of any provision in the workmen's compensation act,
providing for subrogation, the employer has no remedy against the
third-party tort-feasor for the amounts paid by the employer into
the fund as a result of the death of an employee caused by the
negligence of a third-party tort-feasor. Crab-OrchardImp. Co. v.
Chetapeake & Ohio Ry.'
The theory of recovery of damages is to arrive at compensation; no more, and no less.2 In West Virginia this common-law
principle has not been followed with regard to recovery of damages
under the workmen's compensation act. The act, as a result of its
silence regarding the employer's right of subrogation, has been
interpreted by our court to give the employee two remedies; the
one in tort against the third party, and the other in contract
against the workmen's compensation fund.' The two West Virginia cases in so holding also deny the employer the common-law
right of subrogation. The court in reaching this seemingly inequitable result applied the analogy of life and accident insurance at
the expense of the rule against double recovery.
The silence of the act gave ample opportunity for the application of the principle of subrogation, since this doctrine is independent of statute and independent of any privity or contractual
relationship between the parties to be affected by it. 4 Such result
could have been reached by applying the broad definition of suretyship so as to consider the employer as surety for the third-party
1115 F. (2d) 277 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940).
9 McCoRmiox, DAmAoES (1935) 561; Burruss v. Hines, 94 Va. 413, 416, 26
S. E. 875 (1897): "The general rule in awarding damages is to give compensation for pecuniary loss; that is, to put the plaintiff in the same position,
so far as money can do it, as he would have been if ... the tort [had] not
[been] committed." Miller v. New York Rys., 171 App. Div. 316, 157 X. Y.
Supp. 200, 201 (1916): 1 HoNxow, WORMEN 's COMPENSA'ioN (1917) § 46.
z,Merrill v. Marietta Torpedo Co., 79 W. Va. 669, 92 S. E. 112 (1917);
Mercer v. Ott, 78 W. Va. 629, 89 S. E. 952 (1916).
4 Bassett v. Streight, 78 W. Va. 262, 266, 88 S. E. 848 (1916): "1 'This

doctrine of subrogation has been applied freely in this state, and

to its full

extent, upon the general principles of equity, 'without the aid of any statute;
S* . - 'The doctrine is eminently calculated to do exact justice between IerSons who are bound for the performance of the same duty or obligation.' ...
'The doctrine of subrogation, being the creation of courts of equity, is so administered as to secure essential justice, without regard to form, and Is independent of any contractual relation between the parties to be affected by it.' "
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tort-feasor.5 By viewing the relationship of employer and employee under the act, it is apparent that the former is in a sense an
involuntary or nonconsensual surety' and should be subrogated to
the rights and remedies of the employee against the third party.7
The apparent purpose of the workmen's compensation act is
to insure the workman aganist loss from accident resulting from
his employment" and to give him a speedy and expeditious remedy
for his injury.9 As a result of the act the subscribing employer
is forced, as in the principal case, to make large payments in
compensating for injuries resulting from the fault or negligence of
others. Could this be the intent of the legislature? True, the employer passes on such costs or expenses of compensation to the consumers of his products,' but why should the particular class of
consumers be held liable indirectly, when the injury was occasioned
by the negligence of a third party and was really not a risk or
hazard integral with the production of the articles? If the common-law principle of subrogation were applied in such cases, the
employer could reduce the cost of the products to the extent of the
extra hazard of being liable for the injury inflicted upon his workmen by third-party tort-feasors.
Although there is a paucity of authority in support of our
position, it seems that the West Virginia court erred in the two
earlier cases. The circuit court of appeals went so far in the instant case as to admit that the equities favored placing the ultimate loss on the third-party tort-feasor rather than on the innocent
employer and that the injured employee should be given only one
recovery for a single injury. These equities become more apparent
when it is realized that the employee is fully protected, for it is
a settled principle of subrogation that the doctrine is never to be
5 Watriss v. Pierce, 32 N. H. 560 (1856); Magill v. Brown, 20 Tex. Civ.
App. 662, 50 S. W. 642 (1899): "The term 'surety' in its broadest sense
includes every person whose estate is obligated to answer for the default of
another."I

a Wayman v. Jones, 58 Mo. App. 313, 319 (1894): "There is no distinction
between a suretyship created with the consent of the creditor and that which
arises by operation of law."
7 Johnson v. Young, Carson & Bryant, 20 W. Va. 614 (1882): "A surety is
defined as a person who being liable to pay a debt ... is entitled, if it is
enforced against him, to be indemnified by some other person who ought himself to have made payment ...before the surety was compelled to do so ...
8 Hoffer Bros. v. Smith, 148 Va. 220, 138 S. E.474 (1927).
9Humphries v. Boxley Bros. Co., 146 Va. 91, 135 S. E. 890 (1926).
10 1 ]O14NOLD, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 6-9.
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applied so as to prevent the injured party from being fully in11
demnified."
If the West Virginia court cannot reach the result urged
herein, then there is a glaring gap in our compensation act which
should be remedied by the legislature.
P. J. O'F.
W. H. S.
11 Hardman, The Com'mon-Law Right of Subrogation under the Worknmn's
Compensation Acts (1920) 26 W. VA. L. Q. 183p citing Phoenix Ins. Co. v.
First National Bank, 85 Va. 765, 8 S. E. 719 (1889).
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